The European Commission’s recent decision to withdraw the Green Claims proposal is a further indication of the mounting pressure on the ''EU Executive'' to recalibrate its policy agenda in response to shifting electoral priorities. In recent years, right-wing parties have successfully leveraged public concerns over prices and production costs to expand their support base and challenge the core elements of the Green Deal. This dynamic is expected to persist, as nationalist forces continue to gain traction at the expense of the centrist bloc, while mainstream actors struggle to realign their agendas with the evolving mood of the electorate. Our latest research highlights these political fault lines through an in-depth analysis of MEPs’ voting patterns and examines how the evolving balance of power is likely to shape the EU’s future political and policy direction.

Executive summary

• Right-wing parties are expanding their political relevance by integrating economic concerns—such as inflation and production costs—into their agenda, capitalising on voter unease with the short-term costs of the green transition. This marks a shift from their traditional sovereignty-based focus and has opened new space for electoral growth.
• This shift is driven by a widening gap between the EU’s long-term climate agenda—anchored in Commission policy—and the electorate’s more immediate cost-of-living priorities. As green measures began to show visible economic side effects, particularly amid geopolitical shocks, mainstream parties faced growing pressure to adapt.
• Mainstream centrist parties, including the EPP, Renew, and S&D, have responded with recalibrated positions, often supporting climate goals while challenging specific instruments. Yet, these adjustments reveal internal tensions shaped by divergent national interests, with some delegations prioritising affordability and industrial competitiveness.
• A dedicated climate–cost of living index based on 36 key votes highlights these fault lines. Intra-group variation is visible across EPP, Renew, and S&D, with delegations from France, Poland, Romania, and Germany diverging from the more climate-ambitious positions of their peers.
• The voting behaviour analysis indicates that the right groups (ECR, PfE, ESN) are by far the most vocal critics of the Green Deal, thus narratively putting the Green Deal in opposition to prices and economic competitiveness and easily capitalising electorate who grows into sharing this view.
• The promise of immediate economic relief has strengthened the appeal of the right-wing nationalist camp, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where structural disadvantages and war-related disruptions heighten resistance to costly climate policies. Based on our latest projections, right-wing groups, especially PfE and ESN, are on track to gain further ground in the next EP elections—primarily at the expense of the centrist coalition.
• Institutional dynamics are shifting as a result, with right-wing groups increasing their parliamentary influence (e.g., ECR’s rising amendment success) and mainstream actors becoming more reactive. The Commission, though stable, risks becoming politically exposed if its long-term agenda lacks visible short-term responsiveness.
• The pressure is already felt: the Commission announced its intention to withdraw the Green Claims proposal after the EPP signalled they would block it in Parliament.
• A broader political realignment is underway, reinforcing the democratic loop between Brussels and national politics. As EU-level opposition actors challenge Commission policies nationally, and governing parties defend them, the distinction between EU and national political dynamics narrows.
• Ultimately, the Commission’s credibility depends on its ability to improve communication and demonstrate policy benefits more tangibly. Without this, institutional stability may erode as frustrations become directed not at parties but at the EU system itself.

One of the most notable political shifts in the current European Parliament term is the growing capacity of right-wing parties to expand their relevance beyond their traditional focus on sovereignty topics such as migration, nationalism and family values. While these were (and remain) the core issues that allowed them to build their (starting) political capital, right-wing formations have increasingly engaged with debates concerning inflation, production costs, and consumer pressures. As the impact of some of the EU policies like the Green Deal has been felt “on the ground” and whose “side effects” were exacerbated by the geopolitical escalations (which were not fully accounted for when “calculating” the depth and speed of the green transition), political forces across the continent saw the opportunity to expand their base among those societal segments who assess that they have more to lose than to gain (at least on the short term) from a speedy transition. 

The forces to the “right of EPP” did not shy away from taking advantage of a gap that was created between the immediate priorities of the population and the political agenda of the mainstream parties. This gap still exists and provides them further room for growth. Over the past several years the concerns about prices and the economic situation have consistently ranked higher (on average across the EU) than any other consideration, including the climate policy agenda, whose momentum has faded. When asked about the top issues that the EU is facing (which is also a strong proxy for what the electorate expects the political leaders at the EU level should focus on), the picture looks like this:

Furthermore, when asked about what are the most important issues for their own country, the differences are even more striking, with inflation having overshadowed all the others: 

This has created a long-lasting gap between long-term institutional strategies— spearheaded by the Commission—and the short-term cost pressures faced by the voters. In plain words, sometimes the policy makers think and move much faster and with very long-term goals in mind than the public opinion (which means those who produce, consume, pay the taxes and vote) has been convinced to follow. When this happens, all parties who are seen as "disconnected" are set to lose political support. 

Mainstream parties adjust to shifting priorities with mixed results

The center-right party, the EPP, seemed to have seen this phenomenon and has notoriously repositioned itself toward the end of the previous parliamentary term in opposition to what they labelled as “overly-reaching” green policies of the Commission

For example, they openly called for repealing the 2035 ban on internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. However, following the elections, the group’s position softened. Ursula von der Leyen’s continued support for the ICE ban in her second mandate as Commission President, as well as closer political ties with Renew and S&D, has likely contributed to the EPP’s more cautious tone. According to our specialised report, the EPP continues to align more frequently with the centre-left on climate-related votes. 

However, tensions around this positioning are also evident within the EPP, as well as in other centrist groups such as Renew and S&D, which are responding to increasing pressure from voters’ short-term concerns. 

The economic hardship in Europe is amplifying voters' concerns over the trade-off between climate policies and the rising cost of living

To better capture the structure and depth of these divergences across the Parliament, we developed a dedicated index that captures the climate–cost of living trade-off and how the parties are weighing these priorities. In this research context, the “cost of living” refers to the present and the immediate future, while arguably in the long term the green transition’s impact on the cost of living could reduce and even become positive (at which point there will be no trade-off to discuss). However, the positioning here is not pro/agaisnt hte transition, but rather to what extent this transition should be driven through regulation vs. through market-driven technological innovation. 

This index is based on a selection of 36 key votes from the current EP term (you can find the full list HERE), covering the four policy areas most directly impacted by green regulation: environment, agriculture, energy and transport. The selection process prioritised votes with highest policy relevance and the diversity of amendment sponsorship, ensuring a representative spread across groups. The result functions as a metric in its own right, capturing how groups—and national delegations—navigate the climate vs affordability debate.

The chart highlights divisions within each group (you can find the full list of scores of parties HERE). For example, inside EPP, delegations such as the French Les Républicains (LR) and the Polish Platforma Obywatelska (PO) are among the most vocal in pushing for a stronger simplification agenda, especially a dilution of the environmental standards in the automotive sector. While the Polish delegation is relatively large, it does not have the strength to shift the position of the EPP as a whole on this file.

At the other end of the spectrum, delegations from Benelux and Southern Europe—such as Partit Nazzjonalista (PN) and Partido Social Democrata (PSD) from Malta and Portugal—show more support for ambitious green policies, particularly on plastics and pesticide regulation. The leading German CDU/CSU faction occupies a more intermediate position inside the group.  

Within Renew Europe, Slovak MEPs from Progresívne Slovensko (PS), along with representatives from Northern countries with developed green industries, remain among the strongest supporters of keeping the focus on environmental efforts. Conversely, German MEPs, and especially the members of the Freie Wähler (FW), show more flexibility when it comes to CO2 standards and support the inclusion of alternative fuels in CO2 standards, aligning with Germany’s domestic push for synthetic fuels and industrial flexibility.

Some national delegations inside S&D have also taken a more pragmatic / immediate-focus stance on energy issues. For example, Romania’s Partidul Social Democrat (PSD) supports the deployment of low-carbon technologies, nuclear power, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). This reflects their energy security concerns, especially in light of their geographical proximity to the war in Ukraine. By contrast, Danish S&D MEPs from Socialdemokratiet (SD) remain the most committed to environmental ambitions.

The Greens and The Left remain the most united on the green transition. Although there are minor differences depending on the issue and national context, group cohesion has largely held. For instance, MEP from Czech Piráti supports nuclear energy, consistent with her country’s reliance on nuclear energy in its energy mix. 

Right-wing groups remain the most vocal opponents of current environmental regulation, especially Sverigedemokraterna (ECR, Sweden), Lega (PfE, Italy),  Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (ECR, Poland), Vox (PfE, Spain), among others. Their language is strong, and their political agenda revolves around major deregulation—calling for the abandonment of the ICE ban, the removal of environmental conditions in agriculture or restrictions on non-green energy sources. 

However, even within these groups, divisions exist. For instance, Vlaams Belang and Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (PfE delegations from Belgium and Austria, respectively) have taken a stricter line on energy source classification. They do not fully support nuclear technologies, largely due to domestic political constraints and sensitivities in their respective countries. This confirms that even the most vocal anti-regulation groups are not monolithic and remain subject to national constraints.

Promise of immediate relief boosts the strength of the right-wing camp

The Commission and the mainstream parties continue to focus on long-term solutions—structural reforms, industrial transformation, and climate resilience. Right-wing parties, by contrast, offer the promise of immediate relief. In contexts where economic hardship is rising, the latter strategy has clearer electoral appeal. The electorate in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries is particularly more receptive to this: these countries face structural disadvantages in green technology, a strong reliance on agriculture, and intensified economic fallout from the Russia–Ukraine war. This context fuels scepticism toward the Green Deal and increases receptiveness to short-term economic narratives.

The strategy seems to be paying off according to our latest projections. If EU elections were held this week, the groups on the fringes (especially Patriots and ESN), would gain further ground, to the detriment of the centrist camp and the Greens. 

NB: our seats projections are based on aggregate opinion polls for national elections across all 27 EU countries (data from May 2025)

The electorate's pressure is reshaping institutional dynamics as well. With domestic political capital under strain, many governments and MEPs are reorienting their focus toward national priorities, often at the expense of broader EU goals. In the Council, CEE Member States consistently resist the more ambitious climate agendas advanced by North-Western governments. In the European Parliament, right-wing and fringe groups are escalating their scrutiny of the Commission—not only through amendments but also through a surge in written questions, reflecting a strategy to challenge the Commission at every stage. At the same time, they are ramping up pressure through social media, using platforms like X (Twitter) to engage directly with their electorate and amplify criticism.

In the EP, the rising importance of the parties to the right of EPP is becoming visible, and ECR has emerged as a key beneficiary of this shift: its amendment success rate has increased significantly (currently above that of the Greens), and its proposals are no longer confined to cultural or sovereignty issues. Some of these amendments focus on economic regulation, cost alleviation, and the revision of climate obligations. This repositioning enables ECR (and even others to their right) to appeal to a broader electorate, including business owners and sectoral actors who perceive mainstream parties as either unresponsive or too slow to adapt to new realities such as supply chain disruptions, tariff instability, and inflation.

EU governments are increasing under pressure and constrained by immediate political concerns

What is emerging is not simply a backlash, but a narrative realignment. The parties in the EU government are increasingly perceived as reactive—bound by institutional responsibilities and slow to adjust—while right-wing formations (which are currently the opposition in Brussels) are positioning themselves as more in tune with fast-moving public concerns. 

From a broader, historical perspective (and maybe counter-intuitively), what we are seeing is also a consolidation of the political system of the EU, where the factions that are in opposition in Brussels take the Commission’s policies to the debates of the national arenas, where those factions that are part of the EU government need to defend their participation in such policies - a process which ultimately fuels the democratic feed-back loop. 

Notably, in national democracies this leads to alternation in power, a process which has been accelerating considerably over the past decades, as shown in our specialised reports. 

Remarkably, the EU Commission is currently the most stable form of government on the continent, as it is almost the only one who does not undergo mid-term reshuffles, resignations or elections. This allows it to develop and run long-term legislative vision, contrary to most national governments. 

However, the more politicised its policies are becoming in the public space, the harder it’ll be for the Commission to maintain this status. Furthermore, the lack of perceived alternation to power in the “de facto” EU government contributes to the concentration of frustrations against the institutions as such, rather than against specific parties “in power”, as is the case in national democracies. However, the recent threat by the Renew and the leftist groups to withdraw their support to the Commission for "deviating too much to the right" highlights that this state of affairs may be beginning to change. 

Therefore, it becomes imperative that quality information reflecting the work of the Commissioners and the MEPs reach the actual beneficiaries of their policies, so that the feedback from the society is as much in line with the actual legislative actions, a process which EUmatrix is committed to support through our factual, data-verifiable reports. 

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