EU Council consensus now below pre-Brexit levels

EU Council consensus now below pre-Brexit levels

While the 2024 European elections reaffirmed the European People's Party (EPP) as the dominant force in both the European Parliament and the Commission, the fragmentation of national governments’ political orientations, along with their domestic electoral weakness, makes the Council negotiations increasingly dynamic. Notably, the EU countries found it easier to align during the peak moments of the crises (Covid and the start of the war in Ukraine). However, as the attention has shifted back to the regular legislative activity, the political and policy competition increased. 

EUmatrix analysis of over 1700 Council decisions between July 2009 and March 2025 show that the share of unanimity decisions in the Council has now gone below pre-Brexit times. The sharpest divergences have emerged on budgetary, environmental, and migration-related files. This report examines the main policy, political and regional splits within the Council and their likely impact on future EU policy making ahead of important legislative files and the MFF negotiations.


The data indicates that over the past couple of years the % of unanimous decisions decreased considerably. While between 2020 and 2022 (during the Covid times and the start of the Ukraine war) over 70% of Council decisions were adopted unanimously, this figure has now dropped to below 60%, a level which is below pre-Brexit times (when the non-unanimity was largely driven by the British minority position). 

In the exceptional context of Covid, member states coalesced around collective responses, enabling rapid agreement on measures such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility and relaxed state-aid rules. However, by early 2025, the dynamics had changed significantly, as the attention shifted to actual legislative action and budgetary allocations. 

What drives this trend? A combination of factors. First, the powers of the EU institutions have continued to increase (even accelerated, due to crises) and the EU is now either directly or indirectly guiding the policy in almost every area. Consequently, its policies are becoming increasingly debated and scrutinised in the national public spaces, which pushes the national politicians to position themselves vis-a-vis decisions made in Brussels. In some cases, opposing decisions made in Brussels may be electorally-convenient. Which brings us to the second factor.

As domestic political capital erodes (i.e. political leaders find it increasingly difficult to stay popular among their own electorate), many leaders are increasingly forced to shift their focus toward domestic priorities and try to shine quickly, which reduces their room for manoeuvre at the European level. In the past year, both France and Germany (along with many other EU countries recently) needed to hold early elections. France has changed multiple governments, while Chancellor Merz starts from a low popularity rate already. At the same time, the Spanish government hangs by a thread, while the Italian one is for now stable, but largely at odds with the Franco-Germans (along with the Hungarian one). The picture is completed by the delicate fragile governing coalitions in other countries like the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium or Sweden. 

In practice, this internal fragility does not stay confined to capitals — it directly reshapes how EU negotiations unfold. For stakeholders operating in Brussels and beyond, this fragmentation has already produced measurable effects: interinstitutional negotiations, particularly trilogues, now face greater uncertainty as Council mandates become more fragile and exposed to last-minute fractures.

The shift is also subtly reshaping the institutional balance of power. In some areas, such as comitology, Council fragmentation can indirectly strengthen the Commission, making it harder for governments to reject its acts. But in strategic fields — defence, budget, institutional reform — a divided Council weakens the Commission’s ability to advance new initiatives.

NB: if you are interested in an analysis of the developments on comitology, feel free to get in touch at [email protected]

The European Parliament also sees mixed effects. Council’s fragmentation can strengthen its negotiating position in trilogues, but equally increases the risk that MEPs-backed initiatives stall in the Council when stable majorities cannot be secured.

In this environment, effective advocacy is needed to map national positions issue by issue and understanding where stable majorities can be foreseen. 

At EUmatrix, we track these dynamics in real time, providing assessments of governments’ domestic political capital and (re)positioning on all policies in order to help stakeholders foresee the dynamics of Council decisions (see: eumatrix.eu/en/governments/info). For more information on our tailored analyses and subscriptions, contact us at [email protected].


Against this backdrop, the key strategic question is whether Merz’s rise to power in Berlin can provide the Council with a renewed political centre of gravity. As shown by the map and chart below, Germany’s political shift will substantially strengthen the EPP’s presence in the Council.

However, it is essential to keep in mind that although many governments are now led by EPP-affiliated parties, most rely on complex coalition arrangements — or even external support by other political factions in their national parliaments. Germany itself begins this new chapter against a backdrop of political fragility, with mainstream parties facing historically low approval ratings and Alternative for Germany (AfD) close to becoming the largest party in national polls.

Moreover, despite the EPP’s numerical gains, longstanding geographical divides — particularly between East and West, and between North and South — continue to shape Council dynamics.

Nowhere is this fragmentation more visible than in the behaviour of the Visegrad governments. Once sporadic dissenters, they have, over the past decade, assumed a structurally oppositional role in the Council, particularly on issues linked to sovereignty and socio-cultural values. This trend accelerated with the rise of nationalist agendas in Warsaw and Budapest, and was further reinforced in 2023 by Robert Fico’s return to power in Slovakia. However, it has slightly moderated in Poland, where Donald Tusk has repositioned Warsaw towards a more cooperative line within the Council.

As a reference point, let’s compare the above visual with the minority positions of governments from Western and Southern Europe. In the pre-Brexit times, the data was indicating a steady increase in the United Kingdom’s dissenting behaviour in the Council ahead of the Brexit referendum (and a spike right after) — a trend that was forecasting the unprecedented rift. 


In practice, Visegrad governments tend to oppose Council majorities most frequently on civil liberties and migration, as well as the environment — areas where divisions are particularly acute and difficult to bridge. On environmental policy, CEE countries often form structured minorities against more environmentally-ambitious agendas of North-Western Europeans. Files such as the REACH revision, the European Water Resilience Strategy, and the Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act are already exposed to these divides. 

Beyond the East–West divide, Council fragmentation varies sharply depending on the policy area. The Council voting data analysed by EUmatrix.eu reveals a sharp differentiation across policy fields. For example, on budgetary issues, a distinct coalition of Nordic and "frugal" states — Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria — most often resists the majority. These governments, anchored in fiscal conservatism, consistently push back against proposals they perceive as leading to financial burden-sharing or expanded EU spending. 

The upcoming MFF negotiations will sharpen these tensions. The rise of nationalist and fiscally conservative governments in net contributor countries points to entrenched resistance against Commission spending plans. In this environment, securing majorities will require precise mapping of sectoral divides and a granular understanding of Member State priorities.

In a Council where stable coalitions are increasingly rare, effective advocacy depends on knowing not only who will oppose or support a file, but also why and under what conditions. 

At EUmatrix, we systematically extract, structure, and analyse positions expressed by government representatives in Council sessions, as well as in the media and social media. This enables stakeholders to anticipate fractures, calculate shifting majorities, and adapt their strategies with precision.

For tailored analyses or subscriptions to our real-time monitoring platform, contact [email protected]

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