This report measures how the EU leaders and influencers are recalibrating their positions on EU–U.S. relations, drawing on a systematic analysis of European (re)positioning during March 2025. This research factors in 3 types of data: 

• Statements of high-level European political leaders
• Votes of European parliamentarians. 
• Portrayal by the media across the European continent. 

Tracking the interplay between political leaders’ positioning, the media sentiment and the public opinion, therefore, offers an early indication of how EU–U.S. relations might evolve—and where political pressure is likely to emerge within the EU.

Media coverage plays a key role in shaping public opinion—and public opinion, in turn, influences how assertive or cautious European politicians choose to be. Over time, this feedback loop translates into real policy consequences, particularly in areas like trade, digital regulation, and foreign policy. Overall, we analysed over 10,000 mentions of Trump across around 100 selected media (both international media and national media from EU Member States). 

How is Trump represented across EU media?

The European map of media sentiment towards Donald Trump in March 2025 illustrates the geopolitical divides and the varying levels of caution that shape how different parts of Europe expect to engage with the new U.S. Administration. 

The map below shows whether Trump is being portrayed positively or negatively on a scale from -100 to +100. 

Note: Due to proportionally lower media sample from smaller countries, our analysis for these cases are less conclusive.

Western and Northern Europe—including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark—shows the strongest negative media sentiment toward Trump, clearly marked in dark red on the map. In these countries, he is largely viewed as a destabilizing figure. 

In Southern Europe, including Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and parts of the Balkans, media sentiment is less hostile but noticeably cautious. Trump’s anti-Brussels rhetoric and nationalist messaging—particularly on migration—find some resonance within part of the media (and therefore part of the population), especially in Italy. However, even in these regions there is currently limited enthusiasm for his broader geopolitical agenda and the media raises concerns about the West’s economic and geopolitical fragmentation. 

Central and Eastern Europe displays a more varied but generally balanced profile, illustrated on the map through lighter shades of orange and yellow. The media from CEE countries recognise the value of the U.S. defense ties and shared values with the United States, while remaining alert to the risks of political volatility in Washington and the U.S.’ shifts in geopolitical focus. 

Differences in media sentiment offer early signals of how national debates on transatlantic issues may shift. As the landscape evolves, tracking changes in tone helps anticipate where cooperation or resistance may emerge—on trade, security, or regulation. 

At EUmatrix, our media monitoring tools capture these shifts in real time, tracking sentiment not only towards leaders, but also towards the direction of key policies. Contact us at [email protected] for more information.

Sentiment of EU and Western leaders on Trump administration

The analysis below provides an assessment of the sentiment towards Trump by EU leaders, based on their statements as reported by media across the continent in March 2025. 

In the chart, this sentiment is expressed on a scale from a maximum of +100 to a minimum of -100. 

Trump’s return to the White House has reactivated old transatlantic fault lines within the EU—but this time, the divide isn’t simply between pro- and anti-American camps. While leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Italy’s Giorgia Meloni offer rhetorical support, their influence is constrained: Orbán is too isolated to shape EU consensus, and Meloni, despite access to Trump and the U.S. conservatives, lacks sufficient traction in Brussels to act as an effective mediator. In Poland, (outgoing) President Duda remains close to Trump, but Prime Minister Tusk’s leadership steers Warsaw back toward EU coordination, diluting Poland’s potential as a bridge.

The real action lies in the middle. Figures like NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer prioritize stability over alignment or confrontation. They would not defend Trump’s worldview but they would not openly challenge it either—choosing instead to preserve cooperation on defense and trade. This pragmatic bloc holds institutional weight, but its influence depends on its ability to coordinate—not just avoid escalation.

Currently, the most assertive responses are coming from Berlin, Paris, Madrid, and Brussels. German leaders criticize Trump’s impact on trade and alliances, while France under Macron sees Trump’s second term as proof that Europe must act alone when needed. Even Marine Le Pen has distanced herself from Trump over Ukraine. Spain’s Sánchez openly opposes Trump’s approach to migration, climate and diplomacy. At EU level, von der Leyen and Kallas promote regulatory assertiveness and security resilience, but their ability to shape outcomes depends on how much backing they receive from national capitals.

Rather than simple fragmentation, what’s emerging is a strategic vacuum with direct consequences for EU policy-makers and PA professionals. Those leaders who have affinity with Trump—Orbán, Meloni, Duda—lack the institutional clout to define a common European position. Meanwhile, those pushing for a more autonomous EU response—Macron, Merz, von der Leyen, Kallas—will face significant hurdles to convert vision into coordinated action across member states. For practitioners in Brussels and beyond, this creates a complex operating environment: one where transatlantic engagement requires navigating not only Washington’s volatility but also internal EU divisions and fluctuating national priorities.

What are the views of European parties on EU-US relations under the Trump administration?

The data in the chart below shows the positions of national parties represented in the European Parliament on EU–U.S. relations based on the MEPs’ voting behaviour on 26 plenary votes since the beginning of the current parliamentary term. 

NB: on the EUmatrix.eu platform, you can find similar assessments of the positions of MEPs on all topics currently discussed at the EU level (trade, health, energy, environment, digital, defence, etc.)

The main European political groups—such as the EPP, S&D, Renew—adopt a rather moderate approach, thus balancing their disagreements of the political and geopolitical orientation of the Trump administration with a strong dose of pragmatism. The calls for a more autonomous EU coexist with the reality that Europe remains deeply intertwined with the U.S. on security, trade, and technology. Yet, beneath this cautious consensus, important divisions persist both between groups and within the groups themselves.

A striking example of this internal divergence is found among the French parties, which across political families—from the centre-right EPP to Renew, S&D, the Greens, and even the right-wing Rassemblement National—tend to support a more autonomous and assertive EU posture compared to their own groups. Their common thread is a preference for European strategic sovereignty, particularly in defense and technology, and a more cautious stance on following U.S. leadership.

In contrast, some German and Dutch parties appear notably more pro-U.S. than their political group averages. For example, Germany’s SPD and FDP tend to be more supportive of maintaining close EU–U.S. ties compared to their European groups—likely a reflection of economic concerns, particularly over transatlantic trade and industrial supply chains. A similar pattern is evident with the Dutch VVD and BBB, whose economic priorities seem to temper political differences with Washington.

Meanwhile, at the more right-wing end of the spectrum, Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia—led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—and Lega stand out as some of the most Trump-friendly parties in the entire European Parliament. Their position reflects not only ideological affinity, rooted in nationalism and cultural conservatism, but also a longstanding inclination toward strong ties with the United States, regardless of which party controls the White House. This sets them apart from other right-wing nationalist parties across Europe, many of which share Trump’s rhetoric on issues like migration and anti-bureaucracy, but remain wary of deeper alignment with U.S. strategic interests, often favouring a more balanced geopolitical approach. This difference is particularly evident in their views on China: while some parties in the Patriots and ESN groups—such as French Rassemblement National, Austrian FPÖ, Hungarian Fidesz and German AfD —tend to adopt a more conciliatory or neutral posture toward China, others like Lega and Vox take a more critical stance. Their harder line on China aligns with a broader pro-U.S., transatlantic outlook.

Importantly, the parties’ general attitude towards the Trump administration is only one of many factors influencing their voting behaviour on issues such as EU-US trade relations, data transfers, energy partnerships, and more. In fact, within the European Parliament, coalitions often shift from issue to issue—as highlighted in our recent report on EP parliamentary dynamics. A party may align with one group on trade policy, take a different stance on digital data transfers, and diverge again on defence or industrial strategy. For this reason it is essential to gain a granular understanding of where parties—and individual MEPs—stand on each policy dimension.

At EUmatrix, we analyse voting behaviour, debates, and legislative activities to provide our users with real-time data on the positions of policy-makers from the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council across all topics on the EU agenda. For more information, contact us at [email protected].