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Green Deal Positioning in the Von der Leyen II Commission
Contents
Key Findings
To what extent is the von der Leyen II Commission repositioning itself on the regulatory framework it championed?
We analysed 429 public statements — speeches at a wide range of events, interventions in the European Parliament, and Green Deal-relevant passages extracted from multi-topic addresses — in which 22 members of the von der Leyen II Commission took a clear position on climate and environmental regulation. Each statement was scored on a five-point scale: from +2 (strongly supportive — explicitly championing green ambition) through +1 (supportive), 0 (conditional — accepting goals but arguing to soften implementation), −1 (critical — arguing to reduce scope or stringency) to −2 (opposed — arguing to considerably weaken the framework).
Key findings:
We analysed 429 public statements — speeches at a wide range of events, interventions in the European Parliament, and Green Deal-relevant passages extracted from multi-topic addresses — in which 22 members of the von der Leyen II Commission took a clear position on climate and environmental regulation. Each statement was scored on a five-point scale: from +2 (strongly supportive — explicitly championing green ambition) through +1 (supportive), 0 (conditional — accepting goals but arguing to soften implementation), −1 (critical — arguing to reduce scope or stringency) to −2 (opposed — arguing to considerably weaken the framework).
Key findings:
- Adaptation, while no formal change of course. The Commission-wide average stance is +0.71 on the −2 to +2 scale. No commissioner openly calls for dismantling the Green Deal framework, yet the language of the first mandate has shifted: where the previous Commission spoke of climate leadership, this one increasingly speaks of competitiveness, simplification, and calibration.
- Commissioners position themselves differently depending on their portfolio. Four distinct postures are visible. Roswall (Environment), Ribera (Clean Transition), Jørgensen (Energy) and Kadis (Fisheries and Oceans) are the active advocates, consistently championing green standards. Von der Leyen, Hoekstra (Climate) and Lahbib (Crisis Management) act as strategic supporters, backing the agenda but framing it increasingly through competitiveness and geopolitics. Tzitzikostas (Transport) and Fitto (Cohesion) function as passive accepters — they administer green-adjacent programmes without resistance, but equally without advocacy. And Séjourné (Industrial Strategy), Šefçoviç (Trade), Hansen (Agriculture), Albuquerque (Financial Services), Dombrovskis (Economy) and Várhelyi (Health) act as conditioners, systematically arguing to adjust the pace, scope, or implementation burden of green regulation.
- What commissioners say depends on who is listening. Commissioners across the board score higher at environmental conferences and international events than at industry gatherings or in Parliament. The President and the dedicated Climate Commissioner perform the most visible balancing act, adapting their message considerably depending on the audience.
- Commissioners grow into their portfolios. Hoekstra’s gradual shift toward more pro-climate language and Roswall’s consistently strong pro-green positioning both appear consistent with commissioners who increasingly own and defend the policy space they oversee.
- The President as architect and coordinator. Von der Leyen scores above the College average (+1.08 vs +0.71) — closer to the advocates than to the conditioners, but notably below the portfolio commissioners who champion the agenda most vocally. Her positioning suggests a coordinator rather than a standard-bearer: supportive of the framework, but calibrating the message to hold the College together. The resulting spread of postures across the College may reflect a deliberate architecture — with the President positioned as the coordinating figure rather than leading any single camp.
- The Green Deal has changed language. Where the first von der Leyen Commission presented the Green Deal primarily as a response to the climate crisis, this Commission addresses it through the framing of competitiveness and economic resilience. Nearly half of all statements (49%) use economy and competitiveness as the primary justification; only 32% lead with climate and environmental arguments.
The Data
Our dataset covers 429 statements with clear directional positions on climate and environmental regulation, drawn from 15 commissioners over a 16-month period. Each statement was scored on a −2 to +2 scale, classified by audience type, and tagged with its dominant justification frame.
The Scorecard: Where Each Commissioner Stands
How far does each commissioner go in defending — or qualifying — the Green Deal’s environmental ambition? We scored every clear statement on a scale from −2 (arguing to considerably roll back green regulation) to +2 (explicitly championing for increased ambitions). The Commission as a whole averages +0.71. The picture becomes sharper when individual commissioners are examined.
Four postures
4
Active Advocates
Explicitly champion maintaining or strengthening environmental standards
3
Strategic Supporters
Support the green agenda but frame it primarily through competitiveness or geopolitics
2
Passive Accepters
Administer green-adjacent programmes without resistance but without advocacy
6
Conditioners
Systematically argue to soften the pace, scope or implementation of green regulation
Commissioners' Narrative Green Deal Support Index
| Commissioner | Score (−2 to +2) | Statements | Posture |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jessika Roswall | +1.39 | 89 | Active Advocate |
| Teresa Ribera | +1.35 | 20 | Active Advocate |
| Costas Kadis | +1.32 | 59 | Active Advocate |
| Dan Jørgensen | +1.30 | 30 | Active Advocate |
| Hadja Lahbib | +1.17 | 6 | Strategic Supporter (small sample) |
| Ursula von der Leyen | +1.08 | 44 | Strategic Supporter |
| Wopke Hoekstra | +1.01 | 48 | Strategic Supporter |
| Apostolos Tzitzikostas | +0.66 | 40 | Passive Accepter |
| Raffaele Fitto | +0.57 | 7 | Passive Accepter (small sample) |
| Maroš Šefçoviç | +0.20 | 10 | Conditioner |
| Maria Luís Albuquerque | +0.20 | 10 | Conditioner |
| Olivér Várhelyi | +0.14 | 7 | Conditioner (small sample) |
| Stéphane Séjourné | +0.14 | 11 | Conditioner |
| Christophe Hansen | +0.12 | 26 | Conditioner |
| Valdis Dombrovskis | +0.00 | 22 | Conditioner |
Scores represent averages on a −2 to +2 scale. Commissioners with fewer than 3 clear statements on climate/environmental regulation are excluded from this table. “Small sample” flags commissioners with fewer than 10 statements.
The Type of Audience Effect
EU commissioners operate in fundamentally different political environments depending on whether they are addressing an international climate summit, a European industry conference, or a parliamentary committee. The same commissioner may champion ambitious green targets in one setting and emphasise the need for pragmatism in another. This is not necessarily inconsistent — different audiences have different concerns, and political communication involves calibration.
| Commissioner | Environmental conferences | Industry & business | European Parliament | International diplomatic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ursula von der Leyen | +2.0 | +0.2 | +0.6 | +1.5 |
| Wopke Hoekstra | +1.6 | +0.8 * | +0.6 | +1.8 |
| Jessika Roswall | +1.7 | +1.2 | +0.9 | +1.8 |
| Dan Jørgensen | +2.0 * | +1.3 | +1.3 | — |
| Costas Kadis | +1.4 | +1.2 | +1.4 | +1.4 |
Scores on a −2 to +2 scale. Faded cells marked * are based on fewer than 5 statements — indicative but not conclusive. “—” indicates the commissioner did not address Green Deal topics in that setting. Academic/think tank column omitted for readability (available in the methodology appendix).
Evolving Positions: Early vs Maturing Mandate
How has commissioners’ messaging evolved as the mandate has matured? We compared scores from the early mandate (Dec 2024 – Jun 2025) with the maturing mandate (Jul 2025 – Mar 2026), controlling for audience type, and highlight the most noticeable shifts below.
| Commissioner | Context | Early mandate | Maturing mandate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wopke Hoekstra | European Parliament | +0.33 (6) | +0.77 (13) | Became more pro-green in Parliament — moving in the opposite direction to his EPP parliamentary group |
| Jessika Roswall | European Parliament | +1.00 (6) | +0.83 (9) | Slight softening in Parliament, though still well above the Commission average in all settings |
Early mandate: Dec 2024 – Jun 2025. Maturing mandate: Jul 2025 – Mar 2026. Comparisons shown only where at least 5 clear statements are available in each period.
The Commission’s green positioning is not static — and the direction of movement is politically telling. Hoekstra has become noticeably more pro-green in Parliament over the course of the mandate, moving in the opposite direction to his EPP parliamentary group, which has shifted toward more critical positions on climate regulation. Roswall has softened slightly in Parliament but remains well above the Commission average across all settings.
A plausible explanation is that commissioners, over time, develop an institutional interest in making the most of their portfolios — defending the policy space they oversee to build visibility and profile their political career. A Climate Commissioner or Environment Commissioner who waters down their own agenda undermines their own relevance. This creates a natural pull toward advocacy that grows stronger as the mandate matures — and that can diverge from the positioning of the commissioner’s own political family in Parliament.
A plausible explanation is that commissioners, over time, develop an institutional interest in making the most of their portfolios — defending the policy space they oversee to build visibility and profile their political career. A Climate Commissioner or Environment Commissioner who waters down their own agenda undermines their own relevance. This creates a natural pull toward advocacy that grows stronger as the mandate matures — and that can diverge from the positioning of the commissioner’s own political family in Parliament.
How the Green Deal Is Justified
How commissioners justify Green Deal policies reveals as much as whether they support them. When a commissioner defends an environmental regulation, what is the primary argument they reach for? We classified each of the 429 scored statements by the dominant justification used.
| Justification | The argument | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Economy & competitiveness | The Green Deal is discussed through the lens of economic growth, jobs, innovation, and industrial competitiveness — either as a driver of prosperity or as a regulatory burden that needs calibrating | 49% |
| Climate & environment | The case is made on environmental grounds — climate science, biodiversity loss, pollution, the health of ecosystems and future generations | 32% |
| Geopolitics & strategy | Green policy is framed as a geopolitical question — strategic autonomy, reducing dependencies, securing supply chains, or positioning the EU globally | 7% |
| Energy security | The argument centres on energy independence, supply reliability, and energy prices — either as a reason to accelerate or to slow down the transition | 6% |
| Social fairness | The transition is discussed through its impact on people — just transition, regional disparities, affordability, public acceptance | 6% |
| Other | Technical, procedural, or mixed framing | <1% |
Based on 429 Commissioner statements with clear Green Deal positions.
How individual Commissioners frame the Green Deal
The aggregate picture masks sharp differences in how individual commissioners sell — or qualify — the Green Deal. The table below breaks down the dominant justification frame for each of the 15 commissioners covered in this report.
| Commissioner | Speeches | Economy | Climate | Geopolitics | Social | Energy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jessika Roswall | 89 | 43% | 49% | 6% | 1% | 1% |
| Costas Kadis | 59 | 19% | 71% | — | 8% | — |
| Ursula von der Leyen | 44 | 57% | 23% | 9% | 5% | 7% |
| Wopke Hoekstra | 48 | 46% | 42% | 4% | 8% | — |
| Apostolos Tzitzikostas | 40 | 78% | 10% | 8% | 5% | — |
| Maroš Šefçoviç | 10 | 50% | — | 50% | — | — |
| Raffaele Fitto | 7 | 86% | — | — | 14% | — |
| Christophe Hansen | 26 | 62% | 15% | 8% | 15% | — |
| Maria Luís Albuquerque | 10 | 90% | 10% | — | — | — |
| Dan Jørgensen | 30 | 7% | — | 17% | 10% | 67% |
| Teresa Ribera | 20 | 45% | 30% | 5% | 10% | 10% |
| Valdis Dombrovskis | 22 | 95% | 5% | — | — | — |
| Stéphane Séjourné | 11 | 91% | — | 9% | — | — |
| Hadja Lahbib | 6 | — | 83% | 17% | — | — |
| Olivér Várhelyi | 7 | 57% | 14% | — | 14% | — |
Shares based on dominant justification frame per statement. “—” = 0%. Based on the 429 statements with clear directional stances. Bold marks the leading frame.
The political case for the Green Deal is being rewritten
The first von der Leyen Commission built its case for the Green Deal primarily on the urgency of the climate crisis. This Commission is making a different argument: green policy is justified because it makes Europe more competitive, more independent, and more resilient. The economic case now leads in nearly half of all statements, while climate and environmental arguments account for roughly a third — and geopolitical, energy security, and social fairness arguments together make up the remaining 19%. This is not merely a change of style — it shifts the terms on which the Green Deal will be judged. A policy sold as climate protection is evaluated against environmental outcomes; a policy sold as competitiveness is evaluated against economic ones. If the Commission’s own framing increasingly ties green regulation to growth and jobs, it becomes politically harder to defend those regulations when they impose costs.
Methodology
Scope. We scanned all public speeches and statements by 27 members of the von der Leyen II Commission from December 2024 to March 2026, across a wide range of contexts: environmental conferences, industry events, European Parliament plenary debates and committee hearings, Council meetings, international summits, press conferences, academic forums, and political party events. From this universe, we identified 429 statements in which the 15 commissioners covered in this report took a clear directional position on climate and environmental regulation — the basis for the stance scoring, framing analysis, and averages in this report.
About EU Matrix
EU Matrix is the leading independent data-driven political foresight institute that analyses EU decision-making. Its reports are used by a wide range of stakeholders — from industry associations and NGOs to governments and EU institutions, as well as international media.
EU Matrix’s founder and CEO, Doru P. Frantescu, was ranked by Politico among the top 40 influencers in the EU Capital for providing “a data-driven crystal ball to navigate systemic changes” in the EU. Frantescu is also co-author of How to Work with the EU Institutions 2025–2029 (John Harper Publishing).
EU Matrix’s founder and CEO, Doru P. Frantescu, was ranked by Politico among the top 40 influencers in the EU Capital for providing “a data-driven crystal ball to navigate systemic changes” in the EU. Frantescu is also co-author of How to Work with the EU Institutions 2025–2029 (John Harper Publishing).
Need deeper insights? Contact us for tailored research.
Contact: [email protected] | www.eumatrix.eu
Contact: [email protected] | www.eumatrix.eu
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